Lab. Tech. In N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10, et al Cases Required To Testify

In a narrowly decided opinion of 5-4, our United States Supreme Court ordered that laboratory reports related to the testing of drug possession charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5,  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7,  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (and all other drug charges) at a police laboratory are deemed testimonial evidence within the meaning of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.

The significance of this opinion is that a criminal defendant has the right at trial to confront the author of the laboratory. Previously, the prosecutor could just enter the laboratory certificate into evidence at trial as long as an objection wasn't made by the defense attorney 10 days after the receipt of the State's proffer; thus barring a defendant the right to question the lab. tech. as to his or her methodology.

This continues a line of cases expanding the confrontation clause that began with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For examples of New Jersey law which foresaw the United States Supreme Courts holding see, State v. Berezansky, 386 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 2006) (Lab results of a DWI Blood test); State v. Renshaw, 390 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 2007) (Requiring testimony of person who drew blood sample from intoxicated defendant) and State v. Kent, 391 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 2007) (requiring the defendant to alert the prosecutor that the lab tech
will be required to testify in court).

This is an expansion of the law and makes the State's burden of proof a little harder to establish logistically as well as substantively. It allows the defense to attack the nurses in blood drawn, DWI cases, blood drawn drug cases and the lab tech in drug possession cases.
 

Constructive Drug Possession Expert Testimony Leads To Supreme Court Reversal

In the drug possession case of State v. Rahmann Reeds, one of the questions presented was whether expert testimony, presented by the prosecutor, regarding constructive possession of drugs located in a vehicle exceeded the scope of acceptable expert testimony in a drug
prosecution trial. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant suffered undue prejudice from the expert testimony, wherein, the expert expressed that the defendant constructively possessed
the drugs discovered in the car he was driving. This ultimate-issue opinion by the expert usurped the jury's singular role in the determination of defendant's guilt and incurably tainted the remaining trial proofs, producing an unjust result in defendant's trial.

In this case, the Supreme Court opined correctly that the expert's opinion on the issue of constructive possession was nothing more than a legal conclusion which decided the ultimate issue for the jury.

By: Thomas H. Martin, Esq.

www.jerseycriminallawyer.com